Previous posts in this discussion:
PostDenmark and the Holocaust (Alain de Benoist, France, 08/17/12 4:00 am)
Istvan Simon (15 August) related the nice story about the Danish King Christian X which would explain why most of the Danish Jews survived the Holocaust: "When the Nazis ordered Jews to wear a yellow star, Christian X went on his daily horseback ride wearing a yellow star. This gesture galvanized Danish Society."
This story is today universally recognized as an invention. It is just a myth, to use Holger Terp's words (16 August): "The story of the king and yellow star is a myth." Moreover, "the Germans never imposed the yellow star marking on Denmark" (John Eipper, 15 August). In France, the Germans did not require the infamous yellow star marking in the Southern zone, prior to its invasion in November 1942.
The story about the King and the star was certainly popularized by Leon Uris in his famous novel Exodus. But it was invented before, namely in the offices of the National Denmark America Association, where a handful of Danish nationals has opened a propaganda unit called "Friends of Danish Freedom and Democracy," which published a bulletin called The Danish Listening Post. This group hired Edward L. Bernays, "the father of Public Relation and Spin," as a consultant (see Bernays' autobiography, Biography of an Idea. Memoirs of Public Relations Counsel, Simon & Schuster, 1965). Whether Bernays was himself the inventor of the story about the Danish King is not known.
The reasons why 99% of the Denmark Jewish population fortunately survived the Holocaust are certainly numerous: mass-scale support from the population, help from the Resistance, absence of anti-Semitism in Denmark, etc. The particular conditions of the German occupation of the country have also to be considered. When Denmark was occupied by the Wehrmacht on 9 April 1940, King Christian X chose to remain in power, unlike most heads of State under Nazi German occupation, along with the Danish Parliament (which resigned on 29 September 1943). It is known that Nazi Germany wanted to make occupied Denmark appear like a "model protectorate."
The personal role played by the Reich Plenipotentiary (Reichsbevollmächtigter) Werner Best also has to be considered. A senior General SS and Security Police leader, who was previously posted in Paris, Best, born in 1903, was the top German civil authority in Denmark from November 1942 to May 1945. He was a very strange character who seems to have belonged to some "oppositional" faction inside the SS. When Hitler ordered Danish Jews to be arrested and deported on October 1943, he showed for whatever reason some reluctance to obey the orders. According to the Holocaust Education & Archive Research Team, "there is evidence that in Denmark Best sought to sabotage Himmler's orders concerning the implementation of the ‘Final Solution.' Only 477 out of more than 7,000 Danish Jews were finally rounded up by the Nazis who were forbidden by Best to break into Jewish apartments. Pre-warned, the majority of Danish Jews were able, with help, to escape to Sweden and safely."
According to the Danish Jewish Museum (Dansk Jødisk Museum), "Werner Best, the supreme commander in Denmark, was personally deeply involved in ensuring that the Danish Jews were warned before the roundup was carried out on October 1, 1943 [...] The available German police force was not put into action against the flight of the Jews after the roundup on October 1. Persecution of the fleeing Jews and coast patrolling was only assigned to a small group of Gestapo men."
Werner Best was sentenced to death by a Danish court in 1948, but his sentence was reduced to 12 years in prison, in part due to his ambiguous role in the roundup of Jews, and he was granted a clemency release in August 1951.
An interesting and very long (700 pages) biography of Werner Best was published some years ago by Ulrich Herbert: Best. Biographische Studien über Radikalismus, Weltanschauung und Vernunft, 1903-1989, Dietz, Bonn, 1996. There is also a French translation.
The book written by Richard H. Weisberg, Vichy Law and the Holocaust in France (NYU Press, New York, 1996), quoted by Gilbert Davis (15 August), is much more interesting for jurists than for historians. The author is himself a professor of constitutional law at the Cardozo School of Law at Yeshiva University in New York, and has been deeply involved in the "Law and Literature movement." The French edition of his book (Vichy, la justice et les Juifs, Editions des Archives contemporaines, 1998) is not a simple translation: some parts of the content have been substantially changed, there are 8 chapters instead of 10, etc.
JE comments: Most interesting. The proximity of neutral Sweden should also be stressed as a factor which enabled so many Jewish Danes to survive.
Werner Best is certainly one of the more enigmatic Nazi figures--somewhat Schindler-like, although I cannot imagine a sympathetic film on an SS officer ever coming out of Hollywood.
Denmark and the Holocaust; Response from Prof. Leo Goldberger
(John Eipper, USA
08/29/12 2:01 AM)
Leo Goldberger, Professor Emeritus of New York University and editor of The Rescue of the Danish Jews: Moral Courage Under Stress, NYU Press, 1987, sent me this response to Alain de Benoist's post of 17 August. I am pleased to share Prof. Goldberger's comment with WAIS:
The Danish government resigned on August 29, 1943, not in September.
The idea that Dr. Werner Best belonged to an "oppositional faction within the SS" needs some sort of source evidence--as does the notion that he was somehow "Schindler-like." To the best of my knowledge, Best was a committed and very ambitious opportunistic Nazi who did not refrain from the double-play, pleasing both his bosses in Berlin while also trying to secure the cooperation of the Danes--after all the Germans needed the Danes for food and other important supplies.
What is missing in Alain de Benoist's account of Denmark during the occupation years is the role of Ferdinand Duckwitz, the German Naval official and a close confidant of Best's, who strongly objected to Best's impulsive telegram to Hitler on September 8, 1943, which initiated the plans for the round-up of the Danish Jews--and which he subsequently attempted to undo with the help of Duckwitz.
And while I agree that the proximity of Sweden played a major role in the success of the rescue, I might also add that the inter-service rivalry (as between the SS and the Wehrmacht) also played a significant role, as did the rage of many Danes at the inhumanity shown by the Germans in picking on their Danish-Jewish friends and neighbors---who, after all, had done absolutely nothing against the Germans. In the absence of King, government, and Danish police enforcing the edict against opposition to the Germans, they simply expressed their individual protest and rage against the German occupiers by helping their neighbors, whether Jew or not.
JE comments: Leo Goldberger grew up in Denmark and escaped as a youth in October 1943. Prof. Goldberger's Wikipedia biography gives additional information on his fascinating life and research in psychology:
One small clarification: I was the one, not Alain de Benoist, who drew the parallel between Werner Best and Oskar Schindler. It's perhaps inevitable that any Nazi who saved some Jewish lives will be compared to OS.
Finally, I just noted that August 29 (1943), the day the Danish government resigned, was 69 years ago today. Quite uncanny.
Great to hear from Leo Goldberger.
Resignation of Danish Government, August 1943
(Holger Terp, Denmark
08/29/12 12:45 PM)
Leo Goldberger (29 August) wrote that the Danish government resigned on August 29, 1943.
This is not correct, legally or historically. All sources say that the coalition government submitted its resignation to the King ... and ceased to work.
The Department Chiefs Regime / Departementchefsstyret continued the Danish state's functions until Liberation.
The resignation application from the coalition government was never acted upon by the King, with the result among other things, that the ministers' salaries were paid up to and including the Liberation.
JE comments: Is Holger saying that the government resigned, but the King never allowed them to?
What would be the best English translation of Departementchefsstyret? (I think) I've found several options on the Internet, such as "High-Ranking Civil Servants' Regime."
Resignation of Danish Government, August 1943 (Continued)
(Holger Terp, Denmark
08/30/12 6:55 AM)
Following up on my comments of 29 August, the resignation of the government is one of the many still unexplored mysteries of the German occupation of Denmark.
Under normal circumstances--and according to the the Constitution--the Danish king should automatically accept a government's resignation, and call general elections. The Constitution Art. 15 states that the government must either resign or call an election if a majority in parliament says it lacks confidence in the Prime Minister. During or after the 1920 Easter crisis, King Christian X dismissed the Zahle government. Subsequently, the King promised to respect parliamentarianism as customary law and not to be active in policy. Denmark since 1901 has been formulated as negative parliamentarianism, meaning a government shall resign when there is a majority in parliament against it.
The government's resignation application of 1943 was never debated in parliament and elections were not called for in August-September 1943. The general election on March 23, 1943 was the only election during the occupation.
What actually happened at Amalienborg in the days after 29 August 1943 is still a mystery.
JE comments: How independent was the Danish parliament during occupation? I know very little about this topic, but I sense it was given a good deal of governing power, perhaps more than any other nation under German control. Is this an accurate interpretation?
- on Departementchefsstyret; Comment from Leo Goldberger (John Eipper, USA 08/31/12 2:01 AM)
Leo Goldberger (Prof. Emeritus, NYU) sent this note in response to Holger Terp's post of 29 August:
Needless to say, I could readily have provided a detailed historical account of the political, constitutional and legal contexts within which the break between the German occupiers and the Danish government took place on August 29th 1943, but it would require a much more systematic exposition than I was prepared to do in a brief posting. But whether or not the "break" is to be characterized as a resignation is essentially the sort of polemical nitpicking that, in my view at least, is of little import in a brief and essentially a more general discussion. To simply dismiss my claim as "not correct" is pretty high-handed.
JE asked me in a personal note to explain the Danish "Departmentchefsstyret," brought up in Holger's post.
They were the permanent non-political (i.e. civil service) department heads of the various ministries, who since August 29th had looked after the day-to-day business of government as an interim measure after their politically appointed ministers had resigned en masse. In the course of September an arrangement emerged, with the approval of the Danish political parties and the acquiescence of the Germans , whereby these permanent department heads, 26 in all, were authorized to serve as the de-facto government. While each department head was responsible for his own department, they held frequent joint meetings to discuss such issues and problems as they arose, and the director of the foreign ministry, Nils Svenningsen, conducted all the negotiations with the Germans though Dr. Werner Best, so as to keep the Germans as remote from the Danish administration as possible. This state of affairs continued until the end of the war.
I hope this clarifies what is meant by Departmentchefsstyret.
JE comments: Once again, my thanks to Leo Goldberger for contributing to our conversation. The Departmentchefsstyret seems to have been the ultimate government-by-technocrats system. Were all 26 of the "chefs" prosecuted, or at least discredited, after the war, or did any of them manage to continue at their posts?
Leo Goldberger on the Danish Departmentchefsstyret after WWII
(John Eipper, USA
09/01/12 8:24 AM)
On 31 August, I asked: "The Departmentchefsstyret seems to have been the ultimate government-by-technocrats system. Were all 26 of the 'chefs' prosecuted, or at least discredited, after the war, or did any of them manage to continue at their posts?"
Leo Goldberger responds:
I doubt whether any of the department heads were "prosecuted" after the war. Remember their effort in keeping a semblance of a Danish government going after August 29, 1943 had been sanctioned by the representatives of the Danish political parties. Even the Danish resistance movement and its political leadership, which was in principle opposed to the "policy of negotiation," reluctantly approved as well. (In the absence of a willingness by either the departing government or the King--who was under self-imposed house arrest after Aug. 29--to form a new government, the alternative was far worse than a technocratic but Danish one: namely, a total German take-over!) Thus, at the end of the war, all that happened was that Nils Svennigsen (1894-1985)--a diplomat and the most significant of the technocrats--was in some sense temporarily "demoted" by the immediate post-war government as head of the foreign office and assigned to the lesser post as ambassador to Sweden (1945-1950). He was reinstated as the head of the foreign office by 1951 and served for some 10 years in the next, the H.C. Hansen, government. Later (1961-64), he served in London as the Danish ambassador. Also note that these department heads were all civil service employees and could not readily be fired without serious cause.
JE comments: Svennigsen is a fascinating example of political resilience and longevity. Once again, my thanks to Leo Goldberger for joining us in this conversation.
Leo Goldberger on the Rescue of the Danish Jews
(John Eipper, USA
09/02/12 6:49 AM)
Leo Goldberger (Professor Emeritus, NYU) has sent this followup to our discussion of the 1943 rescue of Denmark's Jewish population:
Having now had a chance to read some of the earlier WAIS postings related to the rescue of the Danish Jews, of which I was one, I want to make a few additional comments to the ones I already made this past week. I trust this will not overburden the topic too much [not at all--JE].
First (re: Holger Terp's post of 16 August), let me point out that the number of Jews saved was slightly over 7000, not 5600 as Holger would have it. I have no idea what his possible source might have been.
Secondly, Holger's assertion that it was the help from the medical profession that was most instrumental in our rescue is a bit of an overstatement. There were actually hundreds, if not a few thousand, volunteers who came to our aid in various ways, providing hiding places and contacts with fishermen, drawn from every sector of life--teachers, professors, students, journalists, policemen, pastors, businessmen and of course, also many physicians and nurses who were in a strategic position to hide several hundred in their hospitals and use ambulances (and famously even a mock funeral procession!) to transport us to fishing villages along the coastline. On that score, I was indeed pleased to see Holger's mention of the brave members of the Women's League for Peace and Freedom, one of whom (Fanny Arnskov by name) in fact helped my own family in our desperate hour of need--as I have detailed in my personal account elsewhere.
Thirdly, in response to Paul Levine's cogent comments and resurrection of Henry Kamm's New York Times informative article on the occasion of the commemoration of the 50th Anniversary of our escape in 1993, I would suggest that the reasons for the successful exodus is less of a mystery than he seems to think. With the flock of younger Danish historians with access to both Danish and German archival material, it now seems pretty clear that the main reason for the success--in addition to the spontaneous and courageous help we received from friends, neighbors and total strangers and the broadcast by Swedish radio, already on October 2 (the night of the intended roundup) assuring a welcome to its shores--was that unbeknownst to all of us (Jews, "rescuers," and the paid fishermen alike), the Germans essentially had closed their eyes to our escape. There was hardly any pursuit of Jews after the first night, and those caught helping Jews were not really given much of a punishment, barely a slap on the wrist. Once Dr. Best's goons--his SS men assisted by Danish Nazis who showed them the way to our homes--had caught some 480 Jews and sent them off to Theresienstadt, he was satisfied to wire Berlin declaring Denmark "Judenrein." Clearly, Best's priority was to ensure the maintenance of a peaceful and workable relationship with the Danes, while also furthering his ambition to trump General v. Hanneken, his rival, for German leadership in Denmark, an aim which he not only accomplished, but which in the end also played a role in lessening his prison sentence.
Finally, I wanted to share a reference to a recent book, entitled Nothing To Speak Of by Sofie Lene Bak, a historian and researcher employed by the Danish Jewish Museum. It documents the wartime experiences of the Danish Jews, including new data on the 200 children who were left behind by their parents as they fled to Sweden. It also details the experiences of what life as a refugee was like for the Danish Jews in Sweden. Published by Tusculanum Press (www.mtp.dk). In the USA it is available through the University of Chicago Press. It is a very informative, touching and richly illustrated book.
JE comments: When Leo Goldberger has the chance to do so, I'd like to know more about his experience in Sweden during the period immediately following the rescue. Wikipedia says that he emigrated to Canada soon afterwards.
Did the heroic Raoul Wallenberg have anything to do with Sweden's willingness to take the refugees, or was he already in Budapest by late '43?
Rescue of the Danish Jews; Denmark vs. Norway in WWII
(Istvan Simon, USA
09/03/12 5:21 AM)
I am very pleased to read Leo Goldberger's recent contributions to WAIS. Professor Goldberger's specialty is a subject dear to not only my heart, but probably also of every Jewish heart. The Danes are a magnificent example of generosity, courage under stress, and humanity.
Let me be also be the first to pose a question to Professor Goldberger. Danes and Norwegians are very close ethnically, and their languages are also quite similar. What then in your opinion explains the difference in behavior of the Danes and the Norwegians during World War II ?
the percentage of Jews murdered by the Nazis in Norway was about 45%, whereas all sources seem to agree that in Denmark it was less than 1%.
I attributed this difference to the leadership of Christian X, the Danish King, as well as of course the magnificent generous character and valor of ordinary Danes. But I assume that the generous character and valor of ordinary Norwegians is probably pretty similar to their Danish brothers and sisters. Werner Best may not have been as harsh as Norway's highest Nazi authority, yet the Danes spontaneously offered the most courageous support to save their Jews, and the Nazi collaborators in Denmark must have been a tiny minority, while in contrast, Norway had Quisling.
JE comments: A very interesting question. Norway, with its long coastline exposed to the North Sea, was far more vulnerable to Allied naval attack than Denmark--this may have had something to do with the Nazis' heavier hand in Norway. Or perhaps it was Norway's heavy water--essential for German nuclear research. One presumes that had the Germans really wanted to, they could have found a Quisling equivalent for Denmark.
- More on the Rescue of the Danish Jews (Holger Terp, Denmark 09/03/12 6:02 AM)
In response to Leo Goldberger (2 September), I was using a somewhat simplified description of the rescue of the Danish Jews; sorry.
I actually have two sets of German figures on the number of Jews in Denmark 1933-1943.
Translated from the Danish:
1) "I cannot help but refer to the Wannsee Protocol, which was endorsed by a group of the Third Reich's most powerful men during a conference in a villa on the Wannsee outside Berlin on 20 January 1942. The purpose and outcome of the conference was the development and adoption of the said Protocol, the contents of which initiated the start of the genocide of the European Jews. The protocol determines the number of European Jews to be 11 million, including 3.5 million in Russia. According to the statement, there were 5600 Jews in Denmark and 1300 in Norway."
Sofie Lene Bak: Not Something to Talk About--Danish Jews' War Experiences 1943. 1945 Edition. Danish Jewish Museum.
Ikke noget at tale om--Danske jøders krigsoplevelser 1943. 1945 Udg. af Dansk Jødisk Museum.
This is the source I used in the WAIS post:
"Conference Protocol p. 6
1. The following took part in the conference on the final solution of the Jewish question, held on 20 January, 1942, in Berlin, Am Grossen Wannsee No. 56/58:
2) Denmark 5924."
Census data 1920-1930, referenced from: Ruppin, A.: Sociology of the Jews. Berlin: 1930-31. In: Olsen, Albert: Anti-Semitism and Racial Dogma in Modern German Politics, 1933, p 25-27.
In Danish: Folketællinger 1920-1930 refereret fra: Ruppin, A.: Sociologie der Juden. Berlin: 1930-31. I: Olsen, Albert: Antisemitisme og Racedogme i moderne tysk Politik, 1933 s. 25-27.
The historians and the sources do not match.
Displacement of people in the Nordic and Baltic countries in the 1940s: "In the early 1930s the first German refugees started arriving in Nordic countries. But many were turned away and shamefully refused asylum. By the beginning of the 1940s there were about 5,900 German refugees, many of them Jews, in Denmark, Norway and Sweden. During World War II as many as 70,000 children were evacuated from Finland to Sweden for safety, and some 44,000 Norwegians and 18,000 Danes received refuge in Sweden."
The Fate of the Jews of Denmark
"The figures are eloquent, only 284 Jews were arrested on the night of 1 October, of whom 50 were released and only 202 embarked in the Wartheland. They were mostly people who were too old to hide from the police. Casual arrests in the next few days brought the number to 477, but more than 6,000 full Jews and 1,376 half-Jews were smuggled into Sweden in fishing boats between 26 September and 12 October 1943."
See also: Danish Resistance during the Holocaust. [Guest Publication] Hans Holmskov Schlüter. Copenhagen.
From the Holocaust Encyclopedia:
"Over a period of about a month, some 7,200 Jews and 700 of their non-Jewish relatives traveled to safety in Sweden, which accepted the Danish refugees. Boat transports did not stop once the Jewish refugees were safely in Sweden: some continued to bring members of the underground resistance movement to Sweden or smuggle Swedish intelligence agents into Denmark."
"The day after Dr. Best asked Berlin to send a ship to Copenhagen, to accommodate at least 5000 Jews from the Greater Copenhagen area. Jews from Funen and Jutland could be transported by train. Furthermore, he stated that according to the available material there were 1,673 Jewish families in the metropolitan area, in the rest of the country around 33 families and 1,208 persons were emigrants from Germany. In addition approximately 110 Jewish families who no longer belonged to the Jewish Religious Community."
["Dagen efter anmodede dr. Best Berlin om at sende et skib til København, der kunne rumme mindst 5000 jøder fra det storkøbenhavnske område. Jøderne fra Fyn og Jylland kunne borttransporteres med tog. Desuden oplyste han, at der ifølge det foreliggende materiale befandt sig 1.673 jødiske familier i Storkøbenhavn, i det øvrige land ca. 33 familier, samt 1.208 personer, der var udvandret fra Tyskland. Dertil kom ca. 110 jødiske familier, der ikke længere tilhørte det jødiske troessamfund."]
Source: Aktionen mod de danske jøder oktober 1943. Rasmus Kreth og Michael Mogensen, Gyldendal, 1995.
JE comments: I'm somewhat confused, but the sources do seem to disagree on the number of Jewish Danes rescued. Might the discrepancy have to do with the distinction (see above) between "full" and "half-" Jews? What is really important, in my view, is that "only" a few hundred of Denmark's Jewish citizens suffered the horrors of deportation to the camps.
More on the Rescue of the Danish Jews, from Leo Goldberger
(John Eipper, USA
09/04/12 6:31 AM)
Leo Goldberger has sent this reply to the 3 September posts of Holger Terp and Istvan Simon:
I trust everyone is enjoying this Labor day weekend.
Let me quickly straighten out the mixed bag of numbers sent in by Holger:
1. John Eipper was quite correct in the assumption of the heterogeneity of the Jews included as "Danish Jews" in the various citations. Below I cite the most authoritative sociological breakdown of the Jews living in Denmark in April 1940, as reported by Julius Margolinsky (the long-time official Jewish Community librarian and archivist):
Old-establish Jewish families 1,431 persons
20th-Century immigrants 3,112
Refugees (i.e. "stateless") 1,376
As all of these persons were (or at least assumed they were) at risk in the Nazi round-up and practically all Holocaust historians, including the most recent Danish one, Sofie Lene Bak, have treated the sub-groupings as a total unit, 7,220. Similarly with the Wannsee Conference estimate of Norway's Jews as only 1,300; in fact, there were a total of 2,100 Norwegian Jews. (As I recall, the policy of the fate awaiting the so-called "mischlings" had not yet been settled at Wannesee. It was still considered ambiguous in the case of Denmark's Jews and may, in part, be the reason for the discrepancy in the numbers.)
2. On the interesting question (posed by Istvan Simon on 3 September) of why the difference between Norway's loss of almost half its Jews vs. the successful rescue of the Jews in Denmark, it is important to keep in mind that Norway declared war on Germany--a fact that many in Denmark had wished their King and government would also have done--instead of their immediate (humiliating) capitulation and a "policy of negotiation" that some Danish patriots viewed as close to "collaboration." (From my own perspective, I am convinced that it was this very "policy of negotiation" that allowed us, Danish Jews, to live without the imposition of the by the Nuremberg Laws, at least until until August 1943--unlike the situation in Norway with its gradual persecution of its Jews.)
The Norwegian King (Haakon VII), unlike his older brother, the Danish King Christian X, steadfastly refused to capitulate and acted quickly to relocate the royal family and government cabinet to the northern parts of Norway, called for the mobilization of Norwegian troops, and vehemently rejected the German's demand that the Norwegian fascist Vidkun Quisling, leader of the tiny political "Unity" party, be appointed prime mister. In any case, the Germans, disillusioned with Quisling's inability to from a functioning and cooperating government (similar to the Danish one), installed the tough Reichskommissar Josef Terboven instead--who, later, as a sort of consolation prize, granted Quisling the token tile of "prime minister and president." After the war, Quisling was of course tried for treason, among other charges against him, and executed on 24 October, 1945.
While the Norwegian King and his governmental entourage fled to England on June 7, 1940 on the British-dispatched HMS Devonshire, and with Norway surrendering a few days later, they continued their governing in exile. From London they continued throughout the war to serve as a vital rallying voice for the significant resistance movement and inspired many Norwegians to join the Allied forces abroad and to save as many as some 1000 Jews at home, by hiding them or getting them over the mountains into neutral Sweden.
No, rather that cast blame on King Haakon for the loss of so many Jewish lives in Norway (some 772 were deported to Auschwitz in 1942 and only 34 survived), the blame must be squarely directed at Quisling and his more than cooperative Norwegian police force who did the bidding of and acted as willing henchmen for Terboven, jointly with the Gestapo and SS troops. This fact must itself be viewed in the context of a long history of Norwegian wariness toward Jews, if not also outright prejudice/discrimination. It was not until 1852 that the Norwegian constitution finally changed to permit Jews from living in Norway, without special Royal dispensation. And the story has not yet ended...increasingly there are reports of a growing anti-Semitic atmosphere in present-day Norway, sometimes in the guise of ant-Israel attitudes, but also, more troubling, a fairly direct linking of anti-Jewish with anti-Muslim sentiments--despite their significant differences in their manifest cultural integration.
- More on the Rescue of the Danish Jews (Holger Terp, Denmark 09/03/12 6:02 AM)
- Rescue of the Danish Jews; Denmark vs. Norway in WWII (Istvan Simon, USA 09/03/12 5:21 AM)
- Leo Goldberger on the Rescue of the Danish Jews (John Eipper, USA 09/02/12 6:49 AM)
- on Departementchefsstyret; Comment from Leo Goldberger (John Eipper, USA 08/31/12 2:01 AM)
- Resignation of Danish Government, August 1943 (Continued) (Holger Terp, Denmark 08/30/12 6:55 AM)
- Resignation of Danish Government, August 1943 (Holger Terp, Denmark 08/29/12 12:45 PM)